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Introduction
For over four decades, the optimal money supply literature has studied the environments under which the Friedman rule may or may not hold. One interesting result, in the context of overlapping-generations models à la Diamond (1965) , is the importance of attaining the (modified) golden rule for the application of Friedman rule. Weiss (1980) had originally argued that Friedman rule does not hold in overlapping generations models. Later, Able (1987) and Gahvari (1988) showed that Weiss's result was due to the generic failure of the laissez-faire equilibrium of overlapping generations models to deliver the (modified) golden rule. Introducing generational lump-sum tax and transfers, or a debt policy, to control capital accumulation allows the economy to attain the (modified) golden rule and restores the optimality of Friedman rule. 1 One important feature of Diamond's (1965) model is that it turns it into a first-best environment through the control of economy's physical capital: The model contains no other intrinsic sources of market failures (such as externalities). Extending the model to include some form of market failure destroys this particular feature of Diamond's model. This opens up the question of optimality of Friedman rule even if the (modified) golden rule is attained. van der Ploeg and Alogoskoufis (1994) , for example, demonstrate that Friedman rule is violated in an overlapping generations model that exhibits endogenous growth. 2 However, although van der Ploeg and Alogoskoufis allow for lump-sum taxation and debt policy, they do not set the fiscal instruments in such a way as to fully control the capital stock of the economy. Indeed, in their model, it is the non-neutrality 1 Gahvari (1988) went further and showed that the optimality of Friedman rule does not rest on the attainment of the modified golden rule. If a switch to Friedman rule is accompanied by generation specific lump-sum taxes that neutralize the ensuing intergenerational wealth transfers, Friedman rule becomes optimal given any initial steady state laissez faire equilibrium. This finding, and the importance of intergenerational wealth transfers appear to have gone unnoticed in the subsequent literature dealing with the Friedman rule until its rediscovery by Bhattacharya et al. (2005) . See, e.g., Freeman (1993) , and Smith (1991 Smith ( , 2002 ). An exception is Ireland (2005) ; this issue has been discussed in Gahvari (2007) . 2 They consider a setup as in Weil (1989) wherein individuals are infinitely-lived but that new generations are born every period. They also rationalize money by putting real balances in the utility function.
of monetary policy that leads to the breakdown of Friedman rule.
Two questions arise regarding the optimality of Friedman rule when physical capital is fully controlled. One concerns an environment wherein the government has additional fiscal instruments to offset the other sources of distortion in the economy. The second environment allows for no additional instruments. The latter environment is particularly interesting in light of Phelps (1973) who raised one of the earliest objections to Friedman rule. Phelps' argument relied on an application of the general theory of second best; see Lipsey and Lancaster (1956) . This well-known proposition in public finance teaches us that familiar first-best prescriptions often do not hold in second-best environments.
Put differently, if there already exists a distortion in the economy, adding another source of distortion can enhance welfare. Applied to a monetary economy, the lesson is that the violation of Friedman rule may in fact be welfare increasing in a second-best environment.
The current paper addresses both of these questions and studies if the control of physical capital ensures the optimality of Friedman rule in overlapping generations model that exhibit an inherent source of distortion-with and without correcting the distortion. The model that I use for this purpose is due to Docquier et al. (2007) who have recently extended Diamond's model to allow for endogenous growth that emanates from building up one's human capital. This model is interesting not only because it allows for (per capita) growth that does not exist in Diamond (1965) , but also the fact that its laissez-faire equilibrium exhibits an additional source of market failure through an intergenerational externality. The externality is due to the positive effect of investment in education on the human capital of not just the investor, but his children as well.
It arises when one's human capital is determined partly through education and partly through the human capital one inherits from his parents. However, in deciding how much to spend on education, individuals ignore the effect that their decision has on the human capital of their children.
To address these questions, the paper introduces money in Docquier et al.'s (2007) model and rationalize it through a cash-in-advance constraint. 3 It derives the dynamics of the model and characterize its balanced growth path under laissez faire. Subsequently, it derives the first-best allocations of this economy and shows that they are not affected by the introduction of money. 4 It proves that the implementation of the first-best, i.e. when both physical and human capital are fully controlled, requires Friedman rule to be satisfied. This result generalizes the earlier result of Able (1987) and Gahvari (1988) to overlapping generations models with endogenous growth. It also puts van der Ploeg and Alogoskoufis' result to the contrary in the right perspective.
Subsequently, the paper proves that Friedman rule holds even if one cannot control human capital accumulation and internalize the externality of education. On the face of it, this result appears to be surprising in the light of Phelps (1973) and the second-best logic. The key to understanding it is that introducing another distortion in the economy via the violation of Friedman rule does nothing to alleviate the existing distortion in human capital accumulation, as long as one fully controls the economy's stock of physical capital. The paper highlights this point.
Other grounds covered by this paper include: (i) A comparison between the values that other economic variables (besides the nominal interest rate) assume in the first-and second-best environments studied. Whereas the value of the nominal interest rate is zero in both environments, the second-best entails a lower endogenous rate of growth and a lower monetary growth rate. (ii) The study of a different second-best environment; one in which human capital accumulation can be controlled but not physical capital accumulation. The paper proves that this setting calls for the violation of Friedman rule. In this case, the distortion due to the violation of Friedman rule does alleviate the distortion due to the lack of physical capital accumulation. (iii) The existence of a negative relationship between money growth rate on the one hand and the endogenous growth rate of the economy on the other. (iv) Non-uniqueness of Friedman rule: A continuum of monetary growth rates and tax rates on consumption during working years result in a zero opportunity cost of holding money. 5 The paper is related to the vast literature on Friedman rule particularly those written in the context of endogenous growth and/or within the overlapping generations framework. van der Ploeg and Alogoskoufis (1994) referred to earlier is one. Paal and Smith 
The model and its laissez-faire equilibrium
Consider the Diamond's (1965) two-period overlapping generations model wherein individuals work in the first period supplying one unit of labor, derive utility from consuming a composite consumption good c in the first period, and d in the second period. There is no bequest motive, and population grows at a constant rate, n. Append to this model (i) money holdings and (ii) human capital accumulation as modeled by Docquier et al. (2007) . To stay within a two-period formulation, assume that the decisions on human capital accumulation, production, and consumption are all undertaken at the beginning of period one and in the order stated. 6 Output of each period can be used for consumption in the same period, or retained with no depreciation, to be used next period as an input either in the educational process of the young or the production process.
Education
At the beginning of time t, the young start life with a given amount of human capital, h t−1 , that they have inherited from their parents. I shall refer to persons born in calendar time t as members of generation t. Thus those who are old at time t are members of generation time t − 1. Education combined with one's inherited human capital determines a worker's effective labor. Thus, investing e t in the young's education raises their effective labor from h t−1 to h t . The human capital formation technology is characterized by the linear homogeneous function Φ (e t , h t−1 ) . That is,
where ϕ (·) ≡ Φ (·, 1). I assume that ϕ (·) is positive, increasing, and strictly concave; it also satisfies the Inada conditions: ϕ 0 (0) = ∞ and ϕ 0 (∞) = 0. 7 When deciding on how much to invest in their education, the young have no resources. They thus borrows e t each for their own education from the old of the previous generation. In this way, each young person raises his effective labor from h t−1 to h t .
In deciding how much to educate himself, the individual choose e t to maximize his net earnings. Let w t denote the real wage at time t (measured in units of composite consumption good), and r t the real interest rate. The individual chooses e t to maximize w t h t − e t (1 + r t ) subject to (1). This yields a solution for e t characterized by
Observe that ϕ (e t /h t−1 ) > 1; otherwise there will be no investment in education.
Production
Production takes place after education. The production technology, which also exhibits constant returns to scale, uses capital, K t , and effective labor, H t , to produce a composite output, Y t = F (K t , H t ). Let N t denote the number of young persons-equivalently workers-at time t, and define output, capital, and effective labor per worker according
The production function can then be presented
. Assuming a competitive setting w t and r t are determined according
At the beginning of period t, prior to the educational and production decisions, the sum of aggregate capital to be used for educational investment of the young, N t e t , and for production, K t , is pre-determined from the savings decisions of the old at time t − 1 when they were young. Moreover, given that the number of young individuals N t is also exogenously given, e t + k t is given at time t. With e t + k t given, the additional four equations (1), (2), (3), and (4) determine the equilibrium values for k t , e t , h t , w t , and as functions of h t−1 .
Money and the current price level
Holdings of money is rationalized through a Clower cash-in-advance constraint. I assume that it takes the form of
where M t is the aggregate stock of money at time t, p t is the price level at time t and α < 1 is the proportion of the old's consumption that has to be financed through cash.
6
The old's money holdings at t consist of two components: their own cash savings from the previous period and a lump-sum money transfer from (or to) the government, s t . All money injections to (or subtractions from) the economy are in the form of these lumpsum transfers. The lump-sum transfer to each old person is set equal to a fraction, θ, of his money holdings from the previous period which he carries into the current period.
That is,
and money stock grows at the rate of θ per period according to
At the end of the production process, each young person receives w t h t out of which he has to pay his educational loan to the old plus interest, e t (1 + r t ), and use the rest for his consumption and savings that will be channeled into the purchase of all real assets and the existing cash in the economy. The resources of the old consist of the educational loan they had given the young plus the associated interest, the capital stock they brought into production process plus interest, their cash holdings, and their lump-sum money transfers. Their budget constraint is given by
Assume that the cash constraint (5) is binding so that M t /N t−1 p t = αd t . Substituting for d t from this relationship into (7), while also substituting θM t−1 /N t−1 for s t . Rearranging the terms yields,
Equation (8) then determines the price level, p t . Observe that p t depends on M t , and through (6), on θ. 
Consumption and saving
Observe first that consumption level of the current old, d t , is determined through equation (7). It depends on the value of p t (which itself depends on θ). Turning to the young, their preferences are represented by
The utility function u(·, ·) is strictly quasi-concave and twice differentiable. The young consume c t each, buy the existing money stock, M t , and save the rest of their income,
Their budget constraint is given by
They choose the values of their current consumption,money holdings,and real savings based on their expectation for the future interest rate, r e t+1 , and the price level, p e t+1 . In doing so, the young realize that their expected future consumption d e t+1 will have be financed from their savings according to their budget constraint when old
Eliminating (K t+1 + N t+1 e t+1 ) between equation (10) and (11) results in the young's intertemporal budget constraint
. (12) Now to consume d e t+1 , the young must hold an amount of cash that satisfies the Clower cash constraint
Denote the inflation rate by π t , and the nominal interest rate by i t so that
8
Using the above notation, applied to expectations, substituting for M t / (N t p t ) from (13) into (12), and simplifying, one arrives at
Observe that not all of the above equations are independent from one another. Moreover, the Clower cash constraint has previously been used in the determination of k t , e t , h t , w t , r t , M t , and p t . The independent equations that remain for the determination of the laissez-faire equilibrium are (10), (14), (15), and (16).
The problem of the young can then be formulated as that maximizing the utility function (9) subject to the intertemporal budget constraint (16) and the human capital formation function (1), when s t+1 is treated as lump sum. This results in the first-order
which is another independent equation. Two of these five equations, (16) and (17), determine c t , and d e t+1 as functions of the already determined variables, e t , h t , w t , r t , p t , as well as the policy parameters, s t+1 , θ, and the expected variables, r e t+1 , p e t+1 , and i e t+1 . Using equations (14) and (15), one can eliminate i e t+1 from the list of expected variables. A perfect foresight assumption, governing the determination of r e t+1 , and p e t+1 (r e t+1 = r t+1 and p e t+1 = p t+1 ), closes the model. As a final observation, note that the determination of d e t+1 fixes, via (10), the value of (K t+1 + N t+1 e t+1 ) , the aggregate amount of capital to be used for educational investment and for production in period t + 1. This confirms my previous assumption, when discussing education and production decisions, that this sum is pre-determined at the beginning of each period from the decisions of the previous period. 
Dynamics
First, to simplify the exposition, rewrite the variables of the model as a fraction of effective labor. Denote b e t ≡ e t /h t−1 and thus rewrite equations (1) and (2) as 8
Similarly, denote b
This allows the production function to be represented by b
, where f (·) is positive, increasing, and strictly concave. One can then rewrite equations (3) and (4) as
Observe that the values of b e t and b k t will be determined as soon as e t and k t are determined. Now, to examine the dynamic evolution of this economy, consider the following three equations: (10), (16) , and (17), where I have replaced the variables in expectation by their "actual" values and dropped all superscripts T . First, from the Clower cash constraint, substitute α d t for M t / (N t−1 p t ) in equation (10), then divide it by p t h t , and substitute in it b e t+1 for e t+1 /h t , ϕ (b e t+1 ) for h t+1 /h t , and ϕ (b e t ) for h t /h t−1 . Simplifying
where b c t ≡ c t /h t and b
, to rewrite it as
Divide this equation by h t , and substitute ϕ (b e t ) for h t /h t−1 to get
Finally, assuming that the utility function (9) is homothetic, the marginal rate of substitution between b c t and b d t+1 and between c t and d t+1 will be the same. It then follows from the first-order condition (17) that
Now eliminate b c t between equations (18), (19), (20), and solve the remaining two equations for b k t+1 and b d t+1 . Noting that i t+1 depends on π t+1 and r t+1 , w t and r t on b k t , and r t+1 on b k t+1 , one will get:
, b e t , π t+1´. Then observe, from the Clower cash constraint (13) , that
Multiply the numerator by h t−1 /h t−1 and the denominator of this relationship by h t /h t to rewrite it as 
Finally, recall that the first-order condition (2) determines b e t as a function of b k t , and thus b e t+1 as a function of b k t+1 . Using these relationships in
e t´l eads to a pair of first-order difference equations of the
The system of difference equations (22)- (23) determines the dynamic path of the economy. Moreover, the economy tends to a balanced growth path if equations (22)- (23) (22)- (23). 9 To examine the (local) stability properties of the steady-state solution, I linearize the system of difference equations (22)- (23) around the steady-state solution
where are such that
d´is in the space spanned by the eigenvectors of Ω that are associated with the eigenvalues of Ω with modulus smaller than one. Now, at t = 0, the value of b k 0 is pre-determined. However, the value of b d 0 depends on p 0 . Consequently, the system will be stable for any value of p 0 if Ω possesses two eigenvalues with modulus less than one. If there is only one eigenvalue with a modulus less than one, then there will be one value for p 0 and a unique path which leads to the steady state.
Balanced growth
At the steady state, equations (20), (19) , (18), (21), (15), (2), (4), and (3) are simplified 
, and
Utility also grows over time. In particular, if the utility function is homogeneous of degree β, u(c t ,
. 10 Thus all per capita terms, h t , e t , k t , c t , d t , increase by a factor of 10 With st+1 = θMt/Nt,
(1 + g) per period and the utility increases by a factor of (1 + g) β . Note that β > 0. 11 The following proposition summarizes these results: 
First best
Let the social welfare function be presented by the discounted sum of the average of all generations' lifetime utilities. The first best is then characterized by maximizing this function subject to every generation's human capital formation and resource constraint.
The human capital formation is given by equation (1); the resource constraint for the generation born at time t is given by
Observe also that the above implies, using (21),
which one can alternatively write, by dividing it by N t , as
The Lagrangian expression for this optimization problem can then be written as,
where ρ ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor reflecting the "planner's" social time preference, and μ t /(1+ρ) t and λ t /(1+ρ) t are the multipliers associated with the resource constraint and the human capital equation at time t. The first order conditions with respect to
, and e t+1 , are
Finally, the transversality condition is:
In characterizing the optimal values of the economic variables, I originally do not mix the implications of either (37) or (38) with those of other first-order conditions of the problem. This facilitates the characterization of second-best outcomes without the instruments for controlling k t and e t which I shall discuss later. Thus derive an expression for λ t+1 /λ t once from (35) by writing it for t + 1 and t and dividing one by the other, and once from dividing (35) by (34). One gets the following two equations
It then follows from (40)-(41) that
Next, substituting from (4) in (37) yields λ t+1 /λ t = (1 + ρ)(1 + n)/(1 + r t+1 ).
Equating this to the expression for λ t+1 /λ t in (41) and using (42)
Finally, use equation (38) to substitute for μ t and μ t+1 into (36). Divide the resulting equation by λ t , substitute for λ t+1 /λ t from (40), and manipulate to arrive at
Balanced growth
On the balanced growth path, b c t and b d t+1 remain constant over time so that equations (42), (43), and (44) simplify to
16 Now, given that on a balanced-growth path the transversality condition (39) reduces to 12 [ϕ (b e)]
in what follows I assume β < 1. 13
Equation (45) shows the first-best marginal rate of intertemporal substitution in consumption. It is the counterpart of equation (17) for the laissez faire. For the two be the same, not only (46) must hold but i = 0 so that the opportunity cost of holding money is zero (as required by Friedman rule). Equation (46) is the modified golden rule condition; this is generally not satisfied in the laissez faire.
Substituting from equation (46) into equation (47), one gets
This is the counterpart of equation (2 which vary with the social planner's discount rate, with their laissez-faire counterparts reveals three possible regimes: First-best values are larger for both b k and b e; first-best 12 Using (46), condition [ϕ ( e)] β < 1 + ρ also implies ϕ ( e) < (1 + r)/(1 + n) so that at the first best, r > n. 13 This assumption makes the satisfaction of (48) easier; it is neither necessary nor sufficient for it.
value of b k is smaller or equal, and first-best value of b e is larger; and (iii) first-best values are smaller for both b k and b e (with the first-best values moving from (i) to (iii) as the utility of future generations is discounted more and more).
Decentralization
Decentralization of the first-best requires the use of a number of fiscal instruments, in particular, generation-specific lump-sum taxes and a subsidy on educational expenditures. Let z y t and z o t denote lump sum taxes imposed at time t on the young of generation T and the old of generation T − 1, and σ the rate of subsidy on educational expenditures. These taxes are related through the government's budget constraint so that
Or, dividing by N t−1 ,
Next dividing (50) by h t yields
where b z (26), (27) , and (29) change to
The remaining steady-state equations in (25)- (32) (25), (28), (29), (31), (32), and (52)-(54). To have these equations lead to the first-best balanced growth path characterized by (45)- (46), the policy instruments must be set as follows. First, lump-sum taxes z y , z o must be set such that the modified golden rule (46) is attained. 14 This requirement is commonplace in overlapping generations models. Second, to have the first best condition (47), or (49), satisfied, a subsidy is required on the purchase of e. The subsidy rate is found from (47) and (54) to be 15
where b e and r take their first-best values. Observe also that in the first best, with condition (46) satisfied, the above relationship is simplified to
Finally, attaining (45) is predicated on the well-known result in the money literature that at the optimum there should be no opportunity cost in holding money; that is that i must be equal to zero. To have (45) satisfied, one must set i = 0 in equation (25) .
The implication of this for the rate of money growth is straightforward. Substituting i = 0 in equation (15) yields (1 + r) (1 + π) = 1 so that from (46)
It the follows from (28) that
where b e is set at its first-best value. The sign of θ follows from the transversality condition (48).
The following proposition summarizes the results of this section.
14 To be precise, one needs to set either z y or z o ; the other is determined through the government's budget constraint (51). 15 In the presence of the subsidy, the young choose e t at t to maximize w t ϕ ( e t ) − (1 + r t ) (1 − σ) e t . This yields, in the steady state,
Proposition 2 The decentralization of the first-best balanced growth path requires generation specific lump-sum taxes, a subsidy on educational expenditures given by equation (55), and the satisfaction of Friedman rule that requires the opportunity cost of holding money to be zero. 
Second best with control of physical capital

Why Friedman rule?
Given our second-best environment, one may wonder why introducing an additional distortion through the violation of the Friedman rule does not improve welfare. The answer lies in the fact the violation of the Friedman rule, in either direction, will not alleviate the existing distortion due to the non-optimality of educational. To demonstrate this, first observe first that in the second-best the relationship between b e and b k is governed by the laissez-fair condition (30) and in the first-best by equation (49). These relationships imply that, for any given same value of b k,
In the FB:
where the inequality sign follows from the concavity of ϕ(·). It then follows from equa- Next, differentiate equation (57) with respect to b k. This yields db e
Intuitively, as b k increases, (1 + r)/w declines and this lowers the cost of borrowing to educate oneself relative to returns to education. This, in turn, increases the demand for education. It follows from equation (59) that the graph of (57) slopes upward. Similarly, one can easily establish, through differentiation, that the graph of (58), relating b e and b k in the first best, also slopes upward. On the other hand, differentiation establishes that 21 Figure 1: the graph of the modified golden rule condition (46) which holds both in the second best as well as first best, slopes downward. Diagram 1 depicts these three graphs.
The upshot of all this is that the first-best value of b e exceeds its second-best value, while the first-best value of b k is smaller than its second-best value. We have
These inequalities show that whereas the second-best value of b e must increase, the second-best value of b k must decrease in order to move the second-best equilibrium "closer" to the first-best equilibrium.
Now observe that the laissez-fair condition (30) , which governs the relationship between b e and b k in the second best, is independent of θ. Specifically, one has db e/dθ = 
First versus second best
The finding that b e SB < b e 
follows that r SB < r F B and w SB > w F B . However, at any given time t, it is not w that matters to the individual but w h t . Now h t grows at the rate of g F B = ϕ(b e F B ) − 1 in the first best and g SB = ϕ(b e SB ) − 1 in the second best, with g SB < g F B . Finally, observe that while i = 0 in both first and second best, the corresponding money growth rate that induces this differs across the two equilibria. Because condition (43) holds in the second best as well, the corresponding monetary growth rate continues to be given
With b e SB < b e F B , the optimal monetary growth rate-the Friedman rule-calls for a smaller monetary growth rate. That is
These results are summarized as:
Proposition 4 Let b k denote physical capital to human capital ratio, g denote the growth rate of the economy, θ denote the money growth rate, and superscripts F B and SB denote first-and second-best solutions. Then, b k SB > b k F B , b e SB < b e F B , g SB < g F B , and
5 Second best without control of physical capital Indeed, from equations (25) and (29), condition (45) is satisfied if
In the first best, when b k is set at its optimal value, (1 + r) = (1 + ρ)(1 + n) [ϕ (b e)] Observe also that 1 + θ must always be positive. It then follows that denominator on the right-hand side of (61) and thus (60) (ii) Friedman rule does not hold in this environment.
(iii) The optimal nominal interest rate is given by equation (60) and the optimal monetary growth rate by (61).
(iv) A positive (negative) nominal interest rate is associated with a "low" ("high")
value of physical-capital to human-capital ratio. 
With equations (31) (27) and differentiate the resulting equation totally with respect to θ. I show in the Appendix that the result is
where I also present the expression for Γ noting that it is positive.
To determine the expression for the right-hand side of (64), partially differentiate the system of equations (62)-(63) with respect to θ. Define
I prove in the Appendix that ∆ > 0 and that ∂b c
Intuitively, as θ increases the relative price of future goods to present consumption increases so that consumers respond by lowering their consumption of future goods and increasing their consumption of present goods.
Substituting for ∂b c/∂θ and ∂ b d/∂θ from (66)-(67) into the bracketed expression on the right-hand side of (64) yields ∂b c ∂θ
This result may at first appear to be counter-intuitive. An increase in θ increases the This result is summarized as:
Proposition 6 An increase in the money growth rate leads to a reduction in the balanced growth path values of the physical capital per human capital ratio and the rate of growth of the economy.
Non-uniqueness of Friedman rule
That Friedman rule of i = 0 ensures the satisfaction of the optimality condition (45) is predicated on the stipulation that there are no consumption taxes in the economy.
Assume instead that the government imposes a tax on the consumption of the young, c, at the rate of τ . This changes the market equilibrium condition (25) to 16
This equation will be reduced to the optimality condition (45) as long as
Moreover, one can easily see from (29) that to have (68) satisfied, all that is needed is to set θ, for any given τ , according to
where b e takes its first-best value.
To sum, as long as there are no commodity taxes (τ = 0), i must be equal to zero in the first best, requiring the monetary authority to set θ according to (56). However, if the fiscal authority levies a tax on the first-period consumption goods at a rate equal to τ , monetary authority should set θ according to (69). Put differently, optimality condition (45) can be attained as a competitive equilibrium not just for i = 0, and thus for a monetary growth rate governed by (56); but for a continuum of i and a continuum of monetary growth rates and tax rates on c that satisfy (69). That is, the Friedman requirement for a zero opportunity cost of money holding will be satisfied by a continuum 16 Observe also that allowing for a tax rate on c changes the market conditions (52)-(53) to 
Conclusion
This paper has studied the implications of introducing money into an overlappinggenerations model with endogenous growth where the rationalization for money holding comes from the Clower's cash-in-advance constraint. It has considered an economy populated with finitely-lived individuals whose human capital is determined partly through education and partly through their inherited human capital. Throughout the paper, to emphasize allocative efficiency, the paper has assumed no government tax requirements.
With an external revenue requirement, one can always reject Friedman rule by suitably ruling out certain fiscal instruments. 18 The main message of the paper has been that, as long as the government can fully control the level of physical capital in the economy and sets it to satisfy the modified golden rule, Friedman rule remains optimal. The result holds regardless of the ability of the government to control the level of human capital. With the control of human capital, controlling physical capital yields a first-best environment. Given this perspec-tive, the result has generalized the earlier result of Abel (1987) and Gahvari (1988) derived for overlapping-generations models without endogenous growth. Without the control of human capital, the economy is in a second-best environment. The result thus contradicts one's intuition based on the second-best theory. The paper has clarified this apparent contradiction by demonstrating that introducing an additional distortion in the economy, via the violation of Friedman rule, does nothing to alleviate the existing distortion in human capital accumulation as long as one can fully control physical capital accumulation. Furthermore, the paper has demonstrated that notwithstanding a zero nominal interest rate in both first-and second-best environments, the monetary growth rate and the economy's endogenous rate of growth are both smaller in the second best.
The paper has also studied another second-best environment; one in which human capital accumulation can be controlled but not physical capital. It has shown that in this setting the distortion due to the violation of Friedman rule does alleviate the distortion due to the lack of physical capital accumulation. Here, second-best optimality calls for the violation of Friedman rule.
Another interesting result is the existence of a negative relationship between money growth rate on the one hand and the endogenous growth rate of the economy on the other. The reason for this is that, in a cash-in-advance constraint model, people carry cash to finance a fraction of their future consumption. Put the other way, their future consumption is equal to a multiple of their cash holdings. Consequently, an increase in the growth rate of money supply, which increases the cost of holding cash and reduces money holdings, leads to a reduction in future consumption that is higher than the original reduction in the individuals' money holdings. This, in turn, requires a smaller level of real savings to be carried into the future. Finally, the paper has also shown that, in the context of a cash-in-advance constraint model, Friedman rule is not unique.
A continuum of monetary growth rates and tax rates on consumption during working years result in a zero opportunity cost of holding money.
